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CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND
FEDERALISM
HONORABLE JOHN GIBBONS*
The organizers of today's symposium suggested that I talk
about the great Chief Justice's views on state sovereignty.
Certainly, the current Supreme Court's preoccupation with that
subject suggests its timeliness. A good place to start the
consideration of John Marshall's contributions in establishing the
structural relationship between the sovereignty of the states and
the superior sovereignty of the United States is the Virginia
Convention that in June of 1788, over rather strong opposition,
ultimately ratified the Constitution of 1787.1 John Marshall,
then a Richmond lawyer, was a delegate to that Convention and
a participant in its debates. 2
The source of Virginian opposition to ratification was the
interrelationship between three key provisions of the 1783 Peace
Treaty with Great Britain, and two key provisions of the
proposed constitution.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Ret.); A.B., College of the
Holy Cross; J.D., Harvard Law School.
I See Dennis M. Cariello, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting for the
Values ofFederalism, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1536 n.208 (1999) (stating that role of
courts and their effect on states was surprisingly heavily debated topic at Constitutional
Conventions); Christina M. Royer, Paradise Lost? State Employees' Rights in the Wake of
"New Federalism, 34 AKRON L. REV. 637, 640-41 (2001) (explaining that sovereign
immunity was raised and heavily debated both in 1776 while drafting Articles of
Confederation, and during ratification of United States Constitution at Virginia
Convention). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 129 (2000) (comparing proposals of different
states, which provided for limited treaty powers).
2 See Brannon P. Dennin, Book Review: Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy
of Judicial Review by William E. Nelson, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 345, 348 (2001) (explaining that
Marshall was active in politics, serving in state and local government, and as delegate to
Virginia Convention which ratified new Constitution). See generally Cariello, supra note
1, at 1536 (claiming one of more passionately debated issues in ratification conventions
was what effect strengthened national government would have on states); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1054 (2001) (noting young
Marshall revealed flaws of George Mason's claims that judicial power and extensive
judicial review would destroy states and individual liberties).
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The Peace Treaty provided in Article IV "that creditors on
either side, shall meet no lawful impediment to the recovery of
the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore
contracted."3 In Article V it provided that completed escheats of
loyalist properties could be undone only by action of the state
legislatures, 4  but in Article VI it prohibited all future
confiscations. 5 Articles IV and VI were extremely unpopular in
Virginia because at the end of the war, Great Britain had carried
off from the south a large number of slaves. The Treaty made no
provision for compensating their owners, while at the same time
it protected British creditors and landowners. 6
The proposed constitution provided in Article VI that "all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."7  This was an explicit reference to the
3 Treaty of Peace, Sept. 13, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, 8 Stat. 80, 82 [hereinafter
Treaty of Peace]; see Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1063 (citing Marshall's argument, when
he defended debtors in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 220 (1796), that treaty provision only
applied in cases where debt existed in 1783); Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?
Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1313
n.169 (1999) (asserting that many states did not enforce U.S.'s treaty obligations, which
would have allowed British merchants to collect their prewar debts).
4 See Treaty of Peace, supra note 3, at art. V.; see also David M. Golove, Treaty-
Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the
Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1123 (2000) (noting that despite Article VI's
promise to loyalists, New York was inflamed by long years of revolutionary battle). See
generally Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American
Courts-Jurisdictional Challenges under the U.N. Drug Traticking Convention by
Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad by US. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401,
1409 n.38 (1996) (explaining Hamilton's argument that Article VI of peace treaty protects
foreign rights by implication).
5 See Treaty of Peace, supra note 3, at art. VI; Golove, supra note 4, at 1122
(concluding that court had no difficulty finding provision for restitution of confiscated
land fell well within scope of treaty power). See generally McDonnell, supra note 4, at
1408 n.25 (noting court in Ware v. Hylton placed emphasis on word debt in Article V
Treaty).
6 See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1901 n.59 (1983) (quoting letter written by
George Mason "[i]f we are now to pay the debts due the British merchants, what have we
been fighting for all this while?"); see also Golove, supra note 4, at 1126 n.142 (noting
Virginia Governor's proclamation suspended Act until Great Britain stop violating Treaty
of Peace by not returning or paying compensation for confiscated slaves); Calvin R.
Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and
Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1229, 1243 n.60 (1990) (asserting treaty was controversial because it did nothing to
compensate southerners for value of slaves carried off by British).
7 U.S. CONST. art. Vi, cl. 2.
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supremacy of Peace Treaty Articles IV and VI over conflicting
state law. And in the Judiciary Article, Section 2 of the
Constitution provided that "the Judicial Power shall extend to all
cases, in law or equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority ... "8 Thus, Article III said in plain
language, that Treaty Articles IV and VI could be enforced as the
supreme Law of the Land by the "Judicial Power" of the United
States. 9
In 1777, Virginia had provided by statute that debts owed to
British creditors could be discharged by payment of those debts
into the state treasury in paper money, and that statute
continued in operation after execution of the Treaty. Moreover,
Virginia had enacted a procedure for the confiscation of real
estate owned by British nationals. The effect on these statutes of
Articles III and VI of the Constitution was a subject of heated
debate in the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Particular
reference was made to a large tract of Virginia real estate owned
by Lord Fairfax. Both the debt problem and the real estate
escheat problem would eventually come before the United States
Supreme Court in two cases in which John Marshall was a
participant, though not as a justice.
The first case is Ware v. Hylton,o a diversity case in which
Marshall, the lawyer, represented Virginia debtors sued in the
United States Circuit Court on a debt to British creditors
contracted in 1774.11 The Virginia creditors had in 1780
pursuant to the 1777 statute paid a part of the debt into the
Virginia treasury, and they pleaded that this discharged that
much of it. The Circuit Court ruled in favor of Marshall's
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
9 See McDonnell, supra note 5, at 1417 (attesting that underlying assumption of
Article VI was that it gave individuals right to assert treaties in federal and state courts
as rules of decision.); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original
Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 603 (1994) (affirming that
Southern defiance of treaty led to Supremacy Clause's declaration that treaties are
binding on states and Article III's provision for federal jurisdiction over cases arising
under duly ratified treaties). See generally Bradley, supra note 1, at 126 (explaining that
uncertainties about scope of state and national powers made it unclear whether treaties
were in fact infringing on states' rights).
10 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 199 (1976).
11 See id. at 235 (Marshall doubted whether Congress has power to make treaty
which would annul legislative act of state).
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clients.12 In his only argument before the United States Supreme
Court, Marshall urged that under Virginia law, the debt was
discharged prior to the execution of the 1783 Treaty.' 3 Marshall
lost the appeal. In a decision having significance to this day, the
Supreme Court held that a treaty could and did retrospectively
nullify the Virginia debt discharge law and restore the obligation
to pay the British creditors.' 4 Thus in losing, Marshall helped, in
a way, to establish the primacy of the United States rather than
the states in the conduct of foreign affairs.'5
Oddly enough in his private affairs, Marshall, with other
members of his family, took steps in reliance on the efficacy of
Article VI of the Peace Treaty that would lead, eventually, to
another great Supreme Court case about federal supremacy. In
1793, they purchased the Fairfax estate that had been mentioned
so prominently in the debates in the Virginia ratifying
convention.1 6 They did so, obviously, in reliance on the protection
afforded to loyalist landowners by Article VI of the Peace Treaty,
and in the belief that the escheat process specified in the Virginia
12 See Ware, 3 U.S. at 221 (Circuit Court allowed demurrer in favor of defendants and
plaintiff brought writ of error before Supreme Court).
13 See id. at 227 (if Virginia law had made direct and unqualified confiscation, there
would be no doubt of its validity, debt would have been discharged and there would be no
reason to revive it); see also Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War:
The Ohgins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 217
n.23 (1998) (commenting that John Marshall had argued that state governments, during
American Revolution, could "confiscate" private debts owed to British creditors because
they were property of enemy aliens).
14 See Ware, 3 U.S. at 244-45 (holding that Federal Constitution establishes power of
treaty over Constitution and laws of states and Court have shown that supremacy clause
was intended and sufficient to nullify law of Virginia); see also Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v.
Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 519 (1840) (stating that Ware held that Treaty of Peace repealed and
nullified all state law, but its own operation, revived debt, removed all lawful
impediments, and was supreme law); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L 132, 142 (2001) (noting
that holding of Ware was that United States's treaty with Great Britain ending
Revolutionary War invalidated Virginia statute that had provided for discharge of private
debts owed to invalidated private British subjects).
15 See Barbara J. Frischholz and John M. Raymond, Lawyers Who Established
International Law in the United States, 1776-1914, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 802, 805 (1982)
(stating that Marshall formulated and qualified doctrine of absolute territorial
jurisdiction of sovereign and that his clear statement of law has been quoted and followed
abroad as well as in this country); Charles F. Hobson, Editing Marshall, 33 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 823, 837 (2000) (noting that Marshall played central role in history and that
although his client's lost on issue, Marshall made best case possible for debtors and
obtained better settlement than they otherwise might have received).
16 See Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Course of American
Constitutional History, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 753 (2000) (stating that after
reaching accord with state over disposition of this vast property, Marshall formed group
with some members of his family to purchase large portion of Fairfax Estate).
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statute had not been completed prior to 1783.17 Had it been,
Article V of the Treaty would have protected landowners who
derived their title through the Virginia escheat rather than from
Lord Fairfax.
Marshall's positions as a lawyer and as a businessman were
actually consistent. In Ware v. Hylton he urged that the critical
event, payment into the Virginia treasury, occurred prior to the
Treaty, while his purchase of the Fairfax estate was made in the
belief that the critical event-formal escheat-was not made
until after its ratification.1 8 In neither case did he challenge the
supremacy of the Treaty over state law, assuming its
application.19 And although his client in Ware v. Hylton lost, in
the land deal the outcome was favorable to him and his
associates. In Fairfax Devise v. Hunter's Lessee2O the Supreme
Court reversed a judgment of the Virginia Court of Appeals and
held that because the formal statutory escheat procedures had
not been invoked, Lord Fairfax's land titles were protected by
treaty.2 1
Coming in 1812 when the United States was again at war with
Great Britain, this reversal was a bitter pill for the Virginians,
and the Virginia Court of Appeals reacted with the most
dramatic assertion of state supremacy in our pre-Civil War
history. It held that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
authorizing the Supreme Court to review judgments of state
courts rejecting federal claims was on state sovereignty grounds
17 See Golove, supra note 4, at 1196 (noting that while title of Fairfax's Estate was
under attack, Marshall took opportunity to organize collective effort among his close
relatives and friends to purchase some of best portions of estate; along with his brother,
he negotiated a complex purchase agreement with Fairfax in 1793, and then instituted
further litigation to affirm under Fairfax title under Peace Treaty of 1783).
18 See Ware, 3 U.S. at 221 (Marshall argued that defendants paid off such debts while
state law continued in full force, despite said Peace Treaty).
19 See id., at 199; Fairfax Devise v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 (1813).
20 Fairfax, 11 U.S. at 603; See Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. 286, 304 (1810) (holding
that Maryland escheat statute passed in 1780 was self-executing, and that Maryland
escheats of loyalist properties were not affected by Peace Treaty).
21 See Fairfax, 11 U.S. at 627 (because possession and seizen continued up to and
after Treaty of 1794, which was Supreme Law of Land, confirmed title to him, his heirs
and assigns and protected him from any forfeiture by reason of alienage); see also Morris
v. U.S., 174 U.S. 196, 229 (1899) (Fairfax gives authority that acts of ownership shown to
have been exercised by him over whole land, vested in him complete seizen and
possession); Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme
Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44
AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 451 (1996) (Court in Fairfax had relied on Treaty of 1783 with Great
Britain in reversing judgment of Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals).
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unconstitutional. 22 In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee23 the Supreme
Court reversed the Virginia judgment, establishing the still-
unchallenged legitimacy of federal court appellate jurisdiction
over state courts. Thus even as an interested party, John
Marshall made a major contribution to the law of the federal-
state relationship.
It was, however, in his capacity as Chief Justice that Marshall
made his greatest contributions in respect to the supremacy of
national law. He did this, moreover, during periods in which the
Supreme Court's authority was under attack by one or both of
the other branches of the federal government.
It is worthwhile, I think, to distinguish between those
pronouncements of what may be called "pure" constitutional law,
and those instances in which he merely pronounced the
supremacy of a national, but not necessarily immutable rule of
law. By "pure" constitutional law, I mean those rules of law that
no sovereignty, either state or federal, is free to change. When
the Court lays down such a rule, it is exercising the Marbury v.
Madison2 4 power of judicial review in its most extreme form, and
such an exercise can legitimately be criticized as undemocratic.2 5
Undemocratic, that is, in the sense that the Court purports to tie
the hands of the democratically chosen branches for all time,
subject only to the cumbersome process of constitutional
amendment. 26
22 See Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 11, 5 (1814) (Fairfax obtained writ of error from
Supreme Court under 25th Section of Act of Congress); see also Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal.
175, 184 (1858) (arguing in a dissent that holding in Hunter conclusively established that
25th Act of Judiciary was unconstitutional); James S. Liebman and William F. Ryan,
"Some Effectual Power:" The Quantity and Quality of Decision Making Required of Article
III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 797 (1998) (noting that on remand, Virginia Court of
Appeals refused to obey Supreme Court's mandate, concluding that Article III's "arising
under" clause gave Court no authority to determine any issue - including whether, on
facts of case, Fairfax retained "title" as of 1783 - that did not itself constitute what we
today call "pure" question of federal law).
23 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
24 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
25 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Diflticulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 750 (1995) (explaining view that judicial review is
"inherently and irreconcilably" undemocratic); see also Alan M. Dershowitz, John Hart
Ely: Constitutional Scholar (A Skeptic's Perspective on Original Intent as Reinforced by
the Writings of John Hart Ely), 40 STAN. L. REV. 360, 365 (1988) (explaining that "taken
to the extreme... judicial review can be transformed into an undemocratic veto by
appointed and unaccountable Uudiciaryl"); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the
Political Question, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1045-46 (1985) (discussing argument that
judicial review is undemocratic).
26 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An
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The founding generation had rejected monarchy, and thus had
rejected the fiction that those exercising governmental authority
derived it from any supernatural source.27 What legitimated
government for them was the periodicity of representative
assemblies that derived their authority from the people who
elected them from time-to-time.2 8 An obvious corollary to this
legitimating principle was that one set of governors should not be
able to tie the hands of their successors. Thus any "pure"
constitutional law was inconsistent with the fundamental
premises of the American rejection of monarchy.
At the same time, however, the framers of the 1787
Constitution were well aware of the dangers to individual
autonomy interests posed by elected legislative assemblies. 29
Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1230
(1984) (noting that there have been few Supreme Court decisions that have been
overruled by constitutional amendment); Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the
Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 811-12 (1974)
(explaining that "apart from rarely used and difficult political recourse of constitutional
amendment.. .the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements are held to be
final...").
27 See Marci A. Hamilton, Perspective on Direct Democracy: The People: The Least
Accountable Branch, 4 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 8 (1997) (noting that Framers
"flatly and righteously" rejected monarchy as basis for government); Robert J. Reinstein,
Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and
Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 394 (1993) (explaining that according to
Declaration of Independence divine rights of kings violated "[1aws of Nature and of
Nature's God"); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case
for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049,
1060-61 (1996) (explaining that Founders rejected divine right of kings as source of
legitimate state power).
28 See Candace H. Beckett, Separation of Powers and Federalism: Their Impact on
Individual Liberty and the Functioning of Our Government, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 635,
638-39 (1998) (explaining that to ensure that government would not end up oppressing
people Framers placed ultimate power in electorate); Kristen Silverberg, The Illegitimacy
of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 TEX. L. REV. 913, 926 (1996) (explaining that central
to Constitutional scheme is belief that elected representatives serve only at will of people);
Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 293 (1997) (noting that "real innovation
under Constitution was that general government depended at all for its authority upon
people" [sic]); Dwayne A. Vance, State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits: What Would
the Framers of the Constitution Say, 1994 BYU L. REV. 429, 436-37 (1994) (explaining
that frequent elections would remind representatives that authority of government
resides with people).
29 See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 558 (1998) (noting that Framers were aware that representative government
could endanger individual rights rather than protect them); Jeremy Elkins, Constitution
& Survivor Stories: Declaration of Rights, 3 U. CEi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 243, 309 (1996)
(noting that American colonists recognized that even governmental bodies elected by
people could neglect certain individual rights and liberties); Raymond Ku, Consensus of
the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535, 555
(1995) (explaining that Founders recognized that representatives of people were "as
capable of tyranny and oppression as any monarch"); see also Frank Goodman, Mark
2002]
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Thus to a limited extent, in Article I, Section 10, they included
certain protections of individual autonomy against some of the
more egregious excesses of state legislatures that had occurred
during the Confederacy under the Articles of Confederation. 30
These, no democratically chosen governors could tinker with.
In the thirty-four years Marshall served as Chief Justice, there
were remarkably few instances in which the Court announced
pure constitutional law binding the states. Toward the end of his
judicial career, in Barton v. Baltimore,31 he confirmed the
common understanding that the Bill of Rights, embodied in
Amendments I through IX, did not bind the states. 32 Earlier,
however, he referred to Article I, Section 10 as "what may be
deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state."33 This was
said in Fletcher v. Peck,34 the first of his Supreme Court opinions
dealing with the impairment of contracts clause. 35 What is most
Tushnet on Liberal Constitutional Theory: Mission Impossible, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2259,
2310 (1989) (discussing disillusionment at many legislative abuses that prevailed at time
of Constitutional Convention); Bruce Stein, The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of
the Republic, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 425-26 (1982) (explaining that experience under
Confederation had shown Framers that legislative branch was capable of usurping powers
delegated to other branches).
30 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that no state shall "emit Bills of Credit;
make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any... ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of Contracts.. ."); see also Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. 213, 216 (1827) (explaining that Framers prohibited bills of attainders and ex post
facto laws "in order to restrain the State legislatures from oppressing individuals by
arbitrary sentences, clothed with the forms of legislation, and from making retrospective
laws applicable to criminal matters"); Robert C. Palmer, The Individual Liberties within
the Body of the Constitution: A Symposium: Obligations of Contracts: Intent and
Distortion, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 635, 641 (1987) (explaining that legislative
history indicates that Art. I, Sec. 10 was intended to act as restriction upon State power).
31 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
32 See id..at 250-51 (stating that provision in Fifth Amendment declaring that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation did not apply to
States). See generally Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A
Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 555 (1998) (explaining that Barron
established that Bill of Rights applied only to Federal government); Joyce A. McCray
Pearson, The Federal and State Bill of Rights: A Historical Look at the Relationship
between America's Documents of Individual Freedom, 36 HOw. L.J. 43, 62-63 (1993)
(explaining that Barron found that Bill of Rights is not applicable to States).
33 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810). See generally Charles F. Hobson, The Bill of
Rights at 200 Years: Bicentennial Perspective: James Madison, the Bill of Rights, and the
Problems of the States, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 273-74 (1990) (noting that
unamended Constitution had to act as sort of bill of rights until adoption of Fourteenth
Amendment); Jane Welsh, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of
Process, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 85 (1983) (suggesting that Article I, Sec. 10 served same
purpose as Bill of Rights absent in original Constitution).
34 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 138.
35 See id. at 87. See generally Ogden V. Witherspoon, 2 Haywood 227 (1802)
(discussing impairment involved in repealing Acts); Hadley Arkes, On the Novelties of an
Old Constitution: Settled Principles and Unsettling Surprises, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 15, 17-18
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significant about this first impairment of contracts case is that
Marshall interpreted the clause as applicable not only to
contracts made among private parties, but also to contractual
undertakings by the state itself. Fletcher v. Peck involved a land
grant made by one Georgia legislature in 1795 that was revoked
by another Georgia legislature in 1796. Because the impairment
clause applied to contracts with the state itself, one periodically
elected legislature could, and did, bind its successor. 36 This was
the purest of pure constitutional law, for if the irretrievable state
grant was beyond the reach of a subsequent state legislature, it
was also beyond the reach of the federal legislature, unless
Congress was prepared in compliance with the Fifth Amendment
to pay compensation for a taking.
Two years after Fletcher v. Peck, Marshall once again dealt
with state impairment of a prior legislature's undertaking. In
New Jersey v. Wilson,37 the Supreme Court reviewed a New
Jersey Supreme Court decision refusing to quash a tax
assessment on lands that had in 1758 by a colonial-era statute
been made exempt from taxation. 38 Since the state action sought
a prerogative writ, New Jersey was the nominal plaintiff, but its
fiscal interest was represented by the defendant assessor.39
Marshall held the state to the bargain made by its colonial
predecessor. 40
Marshall next considered the impairment of contracts clause in
1819 in Dartmouth College v. Woodward41 This famous case also
involved a contract with a government; in this case a royal
(1999) (discussing constitutionally of legislature intervention in contract obligations).
36 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 135 (concluding "one legislature cannot abridge powers of
succeeding legislature").
37 11 U.S. 164 (1812).
38 See id. at 167 (reversing and remanding so "that judgment may be rendered therein
annulling the assessment" in previous proceedings).
39 See State v. Wilson, 2 N.J.L. 282 (1807); see also David P. Currie, The Constitution
in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CFI. L. REV.
887, 889, 900 (1982) (discussing Marshall's acceptance of tax exemption as inherent);
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1947-1948 (1983) (noting New Jersey raised
no Eleventh Amendment or state sovereignty objection to Supreme Court's review of its
courts' decisions pursuant to Section 25 of Judiciary Act.).
40 Wilson, 11 U.S. at 167; see also Sweet v. Schock, 245 U.S. 192, 197-98 (1917);
Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity ofLegislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 667 (1988) (arguing against judicial safeguards protecting
legislative discontinuity).
41 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
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charter granted in 1779. The State of New Hampshire was, at
least in non-federal matters such as foreign affairs, the successor
to the Crown. According to Marshall, the state's devolved
sovereign powers did not, however, include the power to impair
the charter by amendment. 42 Thus even corporations performing
such quasi public functions as education were protected from
state impairment of their charters. 43  The New Hampshire
legislature was bound not only by undertakings made by their
legislative predecessors post-1776, but also by undertakings
made by a long-displaced monarchy.
The outcomes in Fletcher v. Peck, Dartmouth College v.
Woodward and Wilson v. New Jerseywere not preordained either
by the cryptic language of Article I, Section 10, or by the
miniscule record of the Constitutional Convention about the
impairment of contracts clause. Plainly, it could have been read
as applicable only to state impairments of contracts between non-
governmental persons or entities. In the early part of the
Nineteenth Century, however, the Great Chief Justice appears to
have been determined to protect private persons and
organizations from the vagaries of local political action, and thus
to vindicate their reasonable reliance interests.
Marshall wrote two more important impairment of contract
opinions, dealing not with state undertakings, but with state
impairments of private undertakings. These cases, Sturges v.
Crownenshiel 4 and Ogden v. Saunders,45 unlike Fletcher v.
Peck, New Jersey v. Wilson and Dartmouth College v. Woodward
42 See id. at 632-33. See generallyPaul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and
Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L.
REV. 397, 426, 427 (1999) (noting broad method of interpretation Marshall used in his
decision). But see David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and
Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983 DuKE L.J. 471, 489-90 (1983) (comparing Dartmouth
decision with Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. 402 (1850), holding that a term
appointment of a state official is not a contract protected by the impairment clause).
43 See James E. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1038-1040 (2000) (discussing relevancy of Dartmouth holding
during time of business expansion); see also Kevin H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate
Cloak. The Emergence and Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 AM. U. L. REV.
559 n.170 (1984) citing Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636 (defining corporation using
Marshall's premise that corporation exists "only in contemplation of law"); Gilbert L.
Henry, Continuing Directors Provisions: These Next Generation Shareholder Rights
Plans Are Fair and Reasoned Responses to Hostile Takeover Measures, 79 B.U. L. REV.
989, 1028 (1999) (discussing states' intention to promote public services from within
corporate society).
44 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
45 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
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did not involve "pure" constitutional law. They involved state
legislation aimed at permitting debtors overwhelmed by debt to
obtain by judicial action a fresh start. Clearly the national
legislature could provide for such debtor relief, for Article I,
Section 8, Clause 4 authorized Congress to establish "Uniform
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."46 It was not until 1898, however, that Congress enacted
a permanent bankruptcy law.4 7 In Sturges48 Marshall did not
rely on the existence of an unexercised national bankruptcy
power, but on the Contract Clause49 that explicitly bound the
states alone. Since the state debtor relief law was enacted after
the date of the private undertaking, there was an impairment. 50
In Ogden v. Saundrs, 51 Marshall, in his only dissent on a
constitutional law issue, would have applied the Sturgis rule
even to state debtor relief laws in place at the time of the private
contract.52 The majority recognized that the states could, in the
46 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("establish[ing] uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
47 "The Bankruptcy Act," referred to in this section is classified generally to
httpo://www,.lexis.com/researchlbuttonTFLink? m=2dd8d34b4a956c146fBf6a1823c2ef96&
xfereite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21.%5bCDATA%5b45%20USCS%20%a7
%20701%20%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e& butTvpe=4& butStat=0& butNum=3& butlnli
ne=l& l)utinfo=11%20USC% 211 U.S.C.S. § 1 et seq., which was repealed by Act Nov. 6,
1978, P.L. 95-598, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 92 Stat. 1682, enacting Title 11; see 11 U.S.C.S. § 1
(2001); see also 9 AM. JUR. 2D, Bankruptcy §2 (explaining history of 1898 Act along with
preceding three acts in 1800, 1803, 1841); Charles J. Tabb, The History ofthe Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. L.J. 5, 42-51 (1995) (articulating need for
Bankruptcy Clause and Constitutional issues raised).
48 17 U.S. 122 (1819) (holding unconstitutional retroactive debtor relief legislation by
state of New York because it impaired obligation of contracts between debtors and
creditors).
49 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating in part that no state may impair
obligation of contracts); see James W. Ely Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A
Reappraisal, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1028-1046 (2000) (explaining Marshall's
employment of Contract Clause in connection with bankruptcy laws); see also New Jersey
v. Wilson, 11 U.S. 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (both holding
unconstitutional state impairments of contractual obligations applied to private and state
contracts); Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Course of American
Constitutional History, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 776 (2000) (stating Marshall's use of
Contract Clause limited state's power, thus preserving integrity of contractual obligation).
But see Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. 514 (1830) (rejecting Contract Clause
challenge to state tax on capital stock in state chartered banks).
50 See Sturges, 17 U.S. at 187 (arguing even if act was constitutional for all contracts
made after it passed, it is unconstitutional as to existing contacts, since law impairs
contract's obligations). But see Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 643 (1884) (holding that
Congress may enact legislation which impairs contracts).
51 25 U.S. 213, 346-356 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
52 See Sturges, 17 U.S. at 122 (recognizing that when Congress fails to exercise its
constitutional power to enact bankruptcy legislation, states may enact their own
bankruptcy laws, provided that they do not violate Contract Clause); see also Hanover
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absence of Congressional bankruptcy law preempting state law,
at least prospectively provide for relief from private-party
undertakings. 53
Ogden v. Saunders is a rare-perhaps a singular-instance of
Marshall getting things wrong about the federal-state
relationship.5 4 As the bankruptcy clause makes clear, some
legislative authority could enact debtor relief laws. Their
enactment did not involve an invasion of fundamental human
rights. Thus what was involved was which political power, state
or federal, could exercise the legislative choice. Congress had
not, and until 1898, would not do so except for limited periods.55
But if Congress would not, and had not prohibited the states
from doing so, why should the Court substitute its political will
on an economic issue. Whether or not New York could enact
prospective debtor relief laws was essentially a federalistic
question, the resolution of which the majority in Ogden v.
Saunders properly left to the political branches of the national
government. 56 Marshall would have foreclosed those branches
for the future by a "pure" constitutional law decision. 57
Marshall's unpersuasive dissent in Ogden v. Saunders should
be contrasted with two other of his most-famous decisions:
McCollock v. Marylana58 and Gibbons v. Ogden.59
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 181 (1902) (recognizing that when Congress fails to
exercise its constitutional power to enact bankruptcy legislation, states may enact their
own bankruptcy laws, provided that they do not violate Contract Clause).
53 See Ogden, 25 U.S. at 247.
54 See id at 346 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's decision
seriously undermines individual's contractual rights and protection under Contract
Clause); see also id. at 213 (holding that Contract Clause only makes retroactive state
laws impairing existing contracts unconstitutional, not those aimed at future
agreements).
55 See Tabb, supra note 47 at 13-14 (explaining that prior to 1898, States exercised
bankruptcy legislation power in all but 16 of Constitution's first 109 years).
56 See Ogden, 25 U.S. at 263-64 (basing conclusion on majority's condemnation of
Sturges decision, and stating that Federal government's legislative power to pass
bankruptcy laws is supported by Constitution).
57 See id. at 332-58 (examining decision's constitutionality by comparing it to past
court decisions, defining restrictions on freedoms to contract, and exploring roots of
contract law in our society).
58 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (tax on Second Bank of United States unconstitutional because
states lack power to burden operations of federal instrumentalities).
59 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (Congress gave full authority to defendants' vessels to navigate
waters of United States and New York state law prohibiting navigation within its waters
unconstitutional). But see Olken, supra note 16 at 766 (indicating that Gibbons Court did
not only limit state power, but also acknowledged their ability to enact public health and
safety laws).
[Vol. 16:351
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND FEDERALISM
McCollock involved the decision by Congress to charter the
Second Bank of the United States. Central banking is today so
settled a feature of the American economy that most of us
wonder how anyone could doubt the authority of Congress to
create the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913.60 Leaving control of
the money supply in the hands of state-controlled institutions
was never a sound policy. 61 At various times prior to 1913,
however, representatives in control of the national legislative
process thought it was. They were free to act on that insight,
defective as it was, until their successors thought otherwise. But
when they acted, Marshall deferred to their judgment and
rejected state efforts to thwart the operation of the national
central bank by hostile legislation. Marshall never suggested in
McCulloch that the nation must have a central bank, but only
that if the national political branches said we should, no state
authority could interfere.62 The necessary and proper clause in
Article I, Section 5, Clause 18 was read as maximizing the
authority of those political branches in the resolution of
federalistic disputes.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall dealt not with the power of the
national government, but with the power of the states to regulate
interstate commerce, despite the grant to Congress in the
Constitution of authority to do so. 63 Although Mr. Fulton had
been granted a federal patent for his invention of the steamboat,
60 See 12 U.S.C.S. § 226 (2001) (The "Federal Reserve Act" is Act Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6,
38 Stat. 351) (stating in preamble to Federal Reserve Act states that it was intended to
provide for establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish elastic currency, to afford
means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish more effective supervision of
banking in United States, and for other purposes); see also Ali Khan, The Evolution of
Money A Story of Constitutional Nulliication, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 393, 435 (1999)
(explaining history of Federal Reserve Act and articulating need to establish effective
means of supervising banking, monitoring nation's money supply, and providing national
currency for international trade).
61 See id. at 432 (articulating how money supply's current link to national debt and
limits placed on total money supply control inflation); see also Alfred C. Aman Jr.,
Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the
Federal Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 843 (1989) (contrasting gold-standard
commercial banking system Federal Reserve Act aimed to regulate and today's credit-
based economy); Michael W. Strong, Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A
Monetarist Plan for a More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 IND. L. REV.
371, 380 (2001) (stating federal reserve system was established to remedy defects in
United States monetary policy and banking organization which, prior to its passage, led
to recurring money panics and bank failures).
62 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436-37 (States have no power to tax or otherwise impede
Congress's execution of its Constitutional powers).
63 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197-99.
2002]
ST JOHNS JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMEATARY
that grant was of limited duration, and the New York Legislature
enlarged it. It was argued that because of the existence of the
Congressional power to regulate commerce, there was no state
power to do S0.64 This was the same argument that was made in
Sturges v. Crownens'hield about the bankruptcy power. In
Sturges Marshall relied instead on the contract clause.65 It could
have been argued in Gibbons v. Ogden that the patent clause in
Article I, Section 5, Clause 8 had a similarly self-executing effect,
although Gibbons' counsel, Daniel Webster, did not made that
point. Justice Marshall was careful, however, to rest the holding
on the Licensing and Enrollment Act, a federal statute.66 Thus
the Court deferred to the national political branches the ultimate
reach of state power over interstate commerce. Others have
misread his Gibbons v. Ogden opinion as "pure" constitutional
law, but read carefully, it is not.
Five years later, in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek March Co.67
what was implicit in Gibbons v. Ogden became explicit.
Delaware's regulation of interstate commerce on a navigable
stream was valid because Congress had not legislated on the
subject. 68 The respective spheres of federal and state authority,
except to the extent that individual rights were concerned (recall
that Marshall regarded Article I, Section 9 as a bill of rights),
were matters subject to federal legislative determination from
time-to-time.69
The Marshall Court's deference to federal legislative or treaty
supremacy met with resistance at the state level throughout his
64 See id at 189-91 (if navigation was not part of commerce, States, not Congress
would have power to regulate it).
65 See Sturges v. Crowenshield, 17 U.S. 122, 192-93 (Congress has power under
Constitution to establish uniform bankruptcy laws); see also id. at 199 (finding that
contract clause restrains States from passing laws affecting obligations of contracts,
therefore holding that States cannot pass laws discharging obligations of bankrupt
individuals).
66 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 220-21 (stating that issue in question was resolved based
on Licensing and Enrollment Act, and no further examination was necessary).
67 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
68 See id. at 251-52 (opining that if Congress had in fact legislated on this subject,
Delaware's law would have been unconstitutional).
69 See generally, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (stating that
Congress has power to redistribute power over regulation of commerce from itself to
States); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1941) (opining that in order for
States to regulate interstate transportation, they must not be overstepping laws already
passed by Congress); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 320-21 (1851) (stating that
Congress intended to leave regulation of pilots to States).
[Vol. 16:351
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND FEDERALISM
tenure on the Court.70 One clause that was relied on over the
years was the Eleventh Amendment, that amended the judiciary
article by providing that "the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any
Foreign State."71 This amendment overruled the holding in
Chesholm v. Georgia2 that a state could be sued in the United
States Supreme Court by a citizen of another state.
Recall my earlier discussion of Virginia's resistance to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in the Fairfax Devise
litigation, and the Supreme Court's reaction in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee.73 Interestingly, only one of the state courts
opinions in the lengthy Fairfax Devise battle mentions the
Eleventh Amendment.7 4 A few years later, however, considering
a Virginia criminal conviction, Marshall was faced with a motion
by Virginia to dismiss a Section 25 writ of error seeking its
review. The defendant, resisting the motion, urged that the
Eleventh Amendment only applied when federal question
jurisdiction depended on party status, and did not affect federal
question jurisdiction. In Cohens v. Virginia Marshall rejected
Virginia's Eleventh Amendment argument, observing that the
judicial power was extended to all cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States without regard to
parties.7 5 In Worcester v. Georga,76a case in which the party
alignment was exactly that described in the Eleventh
70 See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 672 (1912) (reversing Oklahoma court's decision
that failed to apply treaty); Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 39-41 (1815) (Virginia court
stating that Supreme Court had misinterpreted Constitution in granting Congress
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce). See generally R. Kent Newmyer, John
Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States' Rights Tradition, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 876 (2000) (discussing States' attacks on judiciary and backlash
against Marshall during his tenure).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
72 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
73 See id. at 461-62 n.20 (addressing State concerns and independent movements over
Federal government's jurisdiction in such cases need not be exercised so vigorously as in
other proclaimed "free" nations because of Constitution's unique and express mention of
"people").
74 See Hunter, 18 Va. at 37 (discussing effect of Eleventh Amendment).
75 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 412 (1821) (judicial power, as granted by
Constitution, extends to all cases and controversies arising under federal laws, regardless
of parties).
76 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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Amendment, the Court again reviewed a federal question on a
Section 25 writ of error to a state court. 77
Cohens v. Virginia and Worcester v. Georgia were, of course,
exercises of appellate jurisdiction. Until 1875 there was no
general grant of original federal question jurisdiction to the lower
federal courts. There was, however, a specific grant of such
jurisdiction in the statute that created the Second Bank of the
United States.78 Following the Supreme Court's decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland,79 Ohio determined to put the federal
bank out of business by authorizing state officers to seize the
bank's specie reserves and deposit them in the state treasury.80
The bank sued in the federal circuit court and obtained an
injunction directing the state treasurer to restore the funds. The
treasurer refused to obey it. The circuit court then issued a writ
of sequestration directing federal officers to enter the state
treasury and remove the seized specie. The federal officers did
so, and the Ohio officials appealed to the Supreme Court
contending that the Eleventh Amendment barred the bank's suit.
Marshall's Osborn v. Bank opinion is most often cited for his
broad definition of federal question jurisdiction.81 He, also,
however, explicitly rejected the contention that in a federal
question case the Eleventh Amendment prohibited a suit seeking
the restoration of funds from a state treasury.
In 1829 the Eleventh Amendment defense was asserted in a
boundary dispute in which the State of New Jersey sued the
State of New York relying on the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction.82 New York contended that despite the language in
77 See id at 541.
78 See Pub. Law Incorp. of the Bank Act, 3 Stat. 266, 269 (1816).
79 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 400 (1819) holding unconstitutional
Maryland's bank tax law.
80 See Osborn v. President, Dir. & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 741 (1824).
81 See id at 823 ("when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power
of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions
of fact or of law may be involved in it"); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federal'sm and the
Court: Congress as the Audience 574 ANNALS 145, 148 (2001) (emphasizing Marshall's
treatment of 11th Amendment as merely inconvenience encountered at pleading stage
and not as substantive limit on federal judicial power over federal law claims). But see
Nicole Sabado, Adopting a Jurisdictional Approach to the Rights ofAsset Purchasers from
the FID, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 298 (2000) (constitutional grant of power is broad, it
is statutory law, such as federal question and diversity statutes, which dictates actual
exercise of federal court power to hear case).
82 See State of New Jersey v. People of State of New York, 28 U.S. 461 (1830).
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Article II, Section 2, granting jurisdiction "to controversies
between two or more states," the Court lacked jurisdiction.8 3
Even though New York was a formal party on the record, the
Court rejected this contention. 84 That holding was repeated eight
years later in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.85
Thus it is clear that throughout Chief Justice Marshall's
tenure, under his leadership the Eleventh Amendment was
always confined to its literal terms. It was not applicable to
federal question cases, but only to cases in which federal court
jurisdiction depended on the party status specified in the
amendment.8 6 The only case in the Marshall era or even up to
the Civil War, that actually applied the Amendment in
dismissing a suit is In re Medrozo,87 a case in which a citizen of a
foreign state sought, in an original proceeding in the Supreme
Court, to recover from a state the proceeds of sale of a group of
slaves the state had seized from a ship. 88 The Supreme Court
had neither original federal question nor original admiralty
jurisdiction. Medrozo relied on his alien-party status, and thus
the case fell literally within the language of the Amendment.
Marshall never read the Eleventh Amendment as placing any
limits on the power of Congress to authorize the federal courts to
vindicate federally protected rights against the states. At the
same time, he was, except in the contract clause cases, always
careful to acknowledge on federalistic issues the primacy of the
83 See id. at 464.
84 See id. at 467.
85 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 720 (1838) (asserting court's judicial
power in cases where state is party to action and also establishing subject of boundary
within court's original jurisdiction).
86 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 540 (1832) (stating parties to plea must be
examined to see if it falls within judiciary's power); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 378
(1821) (emphasizing that jurisdiction depends entirely on parties); See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 429 (1819).
87 32 U.S. 627, 632 (1833); See John J. Gibbons, supra note 6, at 1968 (indicating
Madrazzo as only pre-Civil War Supreme Court decision to dismiss suit on Eleventh
Amendment grounds); see also Merritt R. Blakeslee, Case Comment, The Eleventh
Amendment and State's Sovereign Immunity from Suit by a Pivate Citizen: Hans v.
Louisiana and Its Progeny afler Pennsylvania v. Union gas Company, 24 GA. L. REV. 113,
133 (1989) (discussing Madrazzo as only case where sovereign immunity, embodied in
Eleventh Amendment, was dispositive). Compare David J. Bederman, Admiralty and the
Eleventh Amendment, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935, 936 (1997) ("The Eleventh
Amendment.. .clearly indicated intent to limit jurisdiction of federal courts over suits in
which states were named as defendants without their consent.").
88 See Sundry African Slaves v. Juan Madrazzo, 26 U.S. 110, 118-119 (1828).
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federal political branches with respect to their resolution.89 He
may have been a bit too doctrinaire about the contract clause in
his Ogden v. Saunders dissent, but even there he in effect aligned
himself with the Congress that had not enacted a permanent
bankruptcy law.
How far we have strayed from Marshall's wise jurisprudence
respecting the federal-state relationship. To cite just a few
examples, the great holding in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States that federal courts can in federal question cases order
payments out of a state treasury was effectively overruled in
Edelman v. Jordan.90  In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,91 the Court
held that Congress lacked the power to require the states to
comply with the United States patent laws. In a series of cases,
including National League of Cities v. Usery,92 United States v.
89 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President's Authority over Foreign
Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1519 (1999) (explaining Marshall's restraint in
deciding matters reserved for executive decision on basis of separation of powers). See
generally David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial Review,
42 DUKE L.J. 279, 280, 320 (1992) (vindicating Marshall as "Jeffersonian" believing
"judges were [not] intended to decide questions not judicially submitted to them, or to lead
public mind in Legislative or Executive questions.. ."); Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's
Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1159 (2000) (showing Marshall not as advocate of
judicial supremacy but as supporter of system of checks and balances).
90 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment"... (construing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47 (1944))); see also Christopher Buchholtz, Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law and The Fourth Circuit, 1996: 11 Constitutional Law: The King Can Do No
Wrong- How the Harter v. Vernon Court Ignored Confusing Precedent and Simplified the
Analysis Required to Determine Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 75 N.C.L. REV. 2281,
2289 (1997) (establishing focus of courts in Eleventh Amendment proceedings should be
whether state treasuries would be forced to pay potential judgments); William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction
of an Affimative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1120 (1983) (identifying award of money judgments against state as
traditional core of Eleventh Amendment); Jack W. Pirozzolo, Comment, The States Can
Wait: The Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Eleventh Amendment Immunity,
59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1617, 1640 (1992) (disallowing suits seeking compensation to be paid
from state treasury).
91 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that statute cannot be sustained as valid
legislation, because statute represented impermissible abrogation of State sovereign
immunity by Congress); See John D. Livingston, Comment, Uniformity of Patent Law
Following Florida Prepaid: Should the Eleventh Amendment Put Patent Owners Back in
the Middle Again, 50 EMoRY L.J. 323, 323 (2001) (providing that protection of patent law
is illusory because state can claim sovereign immunity under Eleventh Amendment);
Scott D. Nelson, Note, Big Brother Stole My Patent: The Expansion of the Doctrine of
State Sovereign Immunity and the Dramatic Weakening of Federal Patent Law, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 271, 274 (2000) (states are immune from federal intellectual property law
under doctrine of sovereign immunity).
92 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976) ("Congressional enactments which may be fully within
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Lopez9 3 and Printz v. United States,94 the Court construed the
commerce clause not as authority for the national political
branches to determine the respective roles of state and national
authority, but rather as authority for the Court to turn such
determinations into "pure" constitutional law beyond the reach of
our periodically chosen national representatives. As I and others
have argued elsewhere, such political-power disputes should be
resolved in the political arena, not in the courts. 95 The courts
should reserve pure constitutional law for the vindication of
individual human rights. Marshall appreciated this point. When
he wrote Marbury v. Madison, constitutionalism had an
eighteenth-century meaning: a "right order of things" in the
affairs of government. Marbury introduced a second meaning: the
Constitution as law superior to legislation, and thus judicial
review. 96 Marshall recognized that the right order of things in
the state-federal relationship would evolve over time, and that
such evolution should be left to the interplay of interest politics
at the national level rather than constitutionalized in the
Marbury v. Madison sense. He was, I suggest, a wiser political
grant of legislative authority contained in the Commerce Clause may nonetheless be
invalid because found to offend against [various Constitutional provisions]").
93 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming holding that statute in question was invalid as
beyond power of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
94 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (viewing Commerce Clause enactment as "act of
usurpation" that violates principles of state sovereignty).
95 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969) (stating "It is well established
that the federal courts will not adjudicate political questions."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 209-210 (1962) (explaining how political questions that arise from relationship
between judiciary and coordinate branches of government are nonjusticiable); Nixon v.
U.S., 938 F.2d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1991), affd, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (indicating how
political questions contributed to courts finding of nonjusticiability); see also Louis
Henkin, Is there a "Political Question" Doctrine, 85 YALE L. J. 597, 597-598 (1976)
(noting "That there are 'political questions'. . . is axiomatic in a system of constitutional
government built on separation of powers. The federal courts exercise neither the
'legislative Powers' nor 'The executive Power'...").
96 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (Constitution is mentioned
primarily as supreme law of the land above United States laws generally); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Symposium Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court,
Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity: Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1201, 1211 (2001) (citing supremacy clause as the basis of authority for judicial
review). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium On New Directions in
Federalism: The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine. Judicial Review, Sovereign Immunity and
The Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1308 (2000) ("Judicial Review is crucial
to enforcing the American Constitution and all American law."); Edwin Meese III,
Perspective on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decision: The Law of the
Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 986 (1987) ("Judicial review of congressional and
executive actions for their constitutionality has played a major role throughout out
political history.").
2002]
370 ST JOHN'S JOURNVAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
philosopher than any we have seen on the Court lately.
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